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Humans exhibit a preference for options they have
freely chosen over equally valued options they have
not; however, the neural mechanism that drives this
bias and its functional significance have yet to be
identified. Here, we propose a model in which choice
biases arise due to amplified positive reward predic-
tion errors associated with free choice. Using a novel
variant of a probabilistic learning task, we show that
choice biases are selective to options that are pre-
dominantly associated with positive outcomes. A
polymorphism in DARPP-32, a gene linked to dopa-
minergic striatal plasticity and individual differences
in reinforcement learning, was found to predict the
effect of choice as a function of value. We propose
that thesechoicebiasesare thebehavioral byproduct
of a credit assignment mechanism responsible for
ensuring the effective delivery of dopaminergic rein-
forcement learning signals broadcast to the striatum.
INTRODUCTION
An organism’s fitness is determined by its ability to avoid hazard
while in pursuit of reward (Orr, 2009). In light of this, choice is a
terrifically advantageous faculty as it offers a handhold through
which an organism can manipulate the environment in terms of
its needs. However, the advantages of choice come at a cost.
The cognitive overhead associated with identifying needs, op-
portunities, candidate actions, and selecting among them im-
plies that choice-governed behavior will be more demanding
than simple stimulus-driven response. Indeed, evidence sug-
gests that complex choices can be aversive (Iyengar and Lepper,
2000). Nevertheless, humans and animals alike demonstrate a
preference for choice (Bown et al., 2003; Leotti and Delgado,
2011, 2014) and for options that were freely chosen over equally
valued options that were not (Egan et al., 2007; Lieberman et al.,
2001; Sharot et al., 2009, 2010).
Preference for freely chosen options has been viewed through
the lens of cognitive dissonance theory, whereby the psycholog-
ical tension that comes with having to choose among equally
valued options is resolved postchoice by reevaluating those op-
tions in favor of what was chosen (Festinger, 1962). Tversky
(1972) has argued along similar reevaluative lines but suggeststhat the process of choosing alters the importance ascribed to
option features and, as such, postchoice valuation takes place
in a different context where feature weights favor the chosen op-
tion. More recently, studies have shown that humans not only
prefer options they have already chosen but also exhibit a bias
if given the option of making a choice or not (Bown et al.,
2003). Striatal blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal
has been found to correlate with both change in option valuation
postchoice (Sharot et al., 2009) and with the preference for
choice (Leotti and Delgado, 2011, 2014). However, the neural
mechanisms through which these biases emerge have been
left unexplained and so too have their functional significance.
Here, we ask whether choice biases might be diagnostic of a
more general adaptive mechanism.
We aimed to determine whether a computational mechanism
summarizing reinforcement learning (RL) processes in the basal
ganglia (BG) could explain these findings. We hypothesized that
free-choice biases are the behavioral byproduct of a feedback
loop involving the BG and the midbrain dopamine (DA) system,
a mechanism through which positive reward prediction errors
(RPEs) encoded by DA cells are preferentially amplified following
free choice (see Figure 2A). We propose that this feedback loop
alleviates a credit assignment problem in the brain by providing a
channel through which dopaminergic learning signals come to
preferentially target the BG whenever it has taken part in the
agent’s endogenous action selection process that yielded a pos-
itive outcome.
Our hypothesis was motivated by three key findings. First,
exogenously driven behavior is controlled cortically, whereas
endogenous choice-driven behavior depends on additional
recruitment of the BG (Brown and Marsden, 1998; Franc¸ois-
Brosseau et al., 2009). Second, BOLD signal change in human
striatum is correlated with both the anticipation of choice (Leotti
and Delgado, 2011, 2014) and preference for freely chosen
options (Sharot et al., 2009). Third, striatal, but not frontal,
DA was found to increase as a function of choice in rodents
(St Onge et al., 2012). Together, these findings suggest that
choice engages the BG and influences striatal DA levels.
Anatomical work points to amechanism through which the BG
could modulate dopaminergic signals. Tonically active cells in
the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) send inhibitory projec-
tions onto DA cells of the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc)
(Joel and Weiner, 2000). A decrease in SNr activity (as occurs
when an action is gated through the BG) reduces the SNr’s
inhibitory influence over the SNc, thus facilitating DA release
into the striatum (Lee et al., 2004). In other words, the SNr appliesNeuron 83, 551–557, August 6, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 551
A B C Figure 1. Experimental Task Design
(A) Example free-choice (fc) and no-choice (nc)
stimuli used in the task with associated reward
probabilities shown. (B) Training phase: one
stimulus pair is presented per trial. Participants are
asked to select one of the two available options.
Participants were alerted to the free-choice
(Choose) or no-choice (Match) condition prior
to stimulus presentation. On free-choice trials,
participants were free to choose either option,
but on no-choice trials, participants were forced
to select the framed stimulus. Probabilistic feed-
back followed option selection. (C) Test phase:
participants were repeatedly asked to choose the best option among all possible option pairings. Participants were free to choose either stimulus on all trials,
but no feedback was provided. Choice bias was quantified according to performance on trials where equally rewarded free-choice and no-choice options
were paired.
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gates an action, thereby increasing the upper range of DA
release into the striatum should DA cells be driven to burst by
additional afferent SNc inputs.
A biophysical model of these structures has demonstrated
that striatal activity associated with action selection inhibits the
SNr, which in turn disinhibits SNc cells and thereby increases
phasic DA bursting (Lobb et al., 2011). Furthermore, incorpo-
rating such a mechanism into a biologically constrained model
of the BG has been shown to increase learning signal fidelity
and improve performance in complex environments (O’Reilly
and Frank, 2006).
In line with these observations, we hypothesized that phasic
DA bursts are preferentially amplified when they are associated
with BG-gated actions. As such, gated actions should develop
inflated values relative to actions that were not, which would
emerge behaviorally as a preference for freely chosen options.
This mechanism implies that choice bias magnitudes should
be determined by RPE history; and as such, we aimed to system-
atically assess biases across a range of option values and RPE
histories. If choice bias is governed by dopaminergic learning
in the BG, we also reasoned that genetic variation of dopami-
nergic striatal plasticity and reward learning should be predictive
of individual choice bias differences. Specifically, we focused
on the DARPP-32 gene, a gene that has been linked to reward
learning and individual differences in learning to pursue (as
opposed to avoid) options (Doll et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2007,
2009; Stipanovich et al., 2008).
We tested our hypothesis by administering a novel variant of a
probabilistic learning task previously shown to be sensitive to
striatal function across a range of conditions (Doll et al., 2011;
Frank et al., 2004, 2007) and also allowed for a direct comparison
between preference for options that were freely chosen relative
to those that were not. Participants were asked to sample and
learn about six pairs of stimuli of various expected values (see
Figure 1A), with probabilistic feedback (either a point gained or
lost) awarded after each selection (see Figure 1B). Participants
were randomly presented with one of the six stimulus pairs on
each training trial: three of those stimulus pairs allowed partici-
pants to choose freely between both options (fc: free-choice),
whereas the other three stimulus pairs forced participants to
pick a preselected stimulus (nc: no-choice). Critically, no-choice552 Neuron 83, 551–557, August 6, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.trials were yoked to free-choice trials to ensure identical sam-
pling and reward feedback across conditions.
Following the training phase, a test phase probed what had
been learned. Participants were presented with all possible
option pairings and asked to select the better of the two on
each trial (see Figure 1C). Here, participants were free to choose
on all trials but were no longer given feedback. Importantly, to
isolate the value of choice across a range of reward probabilities,
participants encountered trials where they had to choose be-
tween free-choice and no-choice options with identical reward
contingencies.
We formalized the behavioral implications of our hypothesis
using a computational model of striatal RL. To better represent
the BG’s anatomical structure, we extended the standard
actor-critic architecture, which has been suggested to formalize
some of the BG’s core functionality (O’Doherty et al., 2004), by
including opponent actor weights that contribute positive
(‘‘Go’’) and negative (‘‘NoGo’’) evidence for each option. These
distinct sets of action weights embody the functional implica-
tions of D1- and D2-expressing striatal medium spiny neurons
that take part in the direct and indirect pathways, respectively
(Frank, 2005). In this model, RPEs are proportionally added to
Go weights according to learning rate parameter ag, while simul-
taneously having an opposing subtractive effect on NoGo
weights according to learning rate parameter an. Thus, this
extended actor comprises an opponent process where Go and
NoGoweights come to represent positive and negative outcome
expectancy, respectively, and where choice probability is a
function of the relative difference betweenGo and NoGoweights
for each action under consideration. This opponent actor
model captures a wide range of data associated with striatal
dopamine manipulations on learning and incentive motivation
that cannot be captured by standard single actor models (Collins
and Frank, 2014). Here, we further investigated the impact of
free choice amplification of positive prediction errors in this
framework (see Supplemental Information available online for
model details).
RESULTS
To investigate the behavioral consequences of our hypothesis,
we augmented the core BG model to include a parameter, afc+,
A B C
Figure 2. Positive RPE Amplification Mechanism and Choice Bias Patterns
(A) A simplified diagram of the BG/SNc feedback circuitry. Sensory and motor information is projected to the BG via corticostriatal projections, where it is
channeled through both the direct Go (green circles) and indirect NoGo (red circles) pathways, providing positive and negative evidence for each action,
respectively, before converging at the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr). The activity pattern depicted here illustrates a case of balanced Go activity for two
candidate actions, but differential NoGo activity, leading to gating of the right-most action. Vertical bar indicates the gated action to the thalamus. The same
disinhibitory mechanism that gates thalamocortical actions also disinhibit SNc dopaminergic signals via SNr-SNc projections, thereby allowing reinforcement
signals to be amplified when the BG gates an action. The degree of free-choice amplification due to this mechanism is captured by afc+. (B) Model generated
choice bias for a range of afc+ values as a function of reward contingency, computed as the percentage of trials where the free-choice (fc) option was selected. (C)
Participant preferences on choice bias trials as a function of reward contingency, calculated as the percentage of choice bias trials where the free-choice (fc)
option was selected. Error bars indicate SEM.
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both Go and NoGo weights. We then exposed the model to
the experimental taskwhile systematically varying afc+. Figure 2B
illustrates the effect afc+ has on preferences for free-choice
options over equally valued no-choice options. When RPEs
are balanced across choice conditions (afc+ = 1), free-choice
and no-choice options share identical RPE histories, and as
such, the model exhibits no choice bias whatsoever. However,
as afc+ increases it plays a larger role in shaping the action
weights, particularly for rewarding free-choice options that are
associated with positive RPEs more often than not, resulting in
a widening preference for rewarding free-choice options. Human
performance mirrored the model’s response pattern (Figure 2C).
Participants exhibited a strong preference for rewarding free-
choice options over their no-choice counterparts (z = 6.84,
p < 0.001), but showed no such preference for nonrewarding
options (z = 0.71, p = 0.48).
Before probing the choice bias inmore detail, we first establish
that preferences are consistent across the various options by
leveraging the behavioral choice bias pattern to infer a relational
option value structure (see Figure 3A). Here, no-choice values
take on the true expected value of each option (e.g., nc80% = E
[Anc]), whereas free-choice values are adjusted according to
the behaviorally quantified choice biases for each option (e.g.,
fc80% = E[Afc] + bA). The structure depicted in Figure 3A can
then be tested by comparing preferences for any given option
over any of the others.
The value added due to free choice leads to a discrepancy
between equally rewarded options (e.g., bA = fc80%  nc80%).
This discrepancy should translate to a consistent free-choice
preference modulation across all other options (e.g., fc80% 
fc30% = (nc80% + bA)  fc30%, and fc80%  nc60% = (nc80% +bA)  nc60%). We probed for this predicted pattern by assessing
accuracy on trials involving the most rewarding free-choice
and no-choice options, entering root option (Afc, Anc), and paired
option (Cfc, Efc,.Dnc) as factors in a logistic regression (see Fig-
ure 3B). This analysis revealed an overall Afc performance gain
that was consistent across all paired options (main effect of
root option: c2 (1) = 29.23, p < 0.01; main effect of paired option:
c2 (7) = 138.02, p < 0.01; interaction: c2 (7) = 9.25, p > 0.2). Ad-
justing Afc trial accuracy by the behaviorally quantified choice
bias (Figure 3B: Afc  bA) rendered performance indistinguish-
able from Anc trials, indicating that Afc performance benefits
were consistent with the choice bias across all option pairings
(main effect of root: c2 (1) = 0.15, p > 0.6; main effect of pairing:
c2 (7) = 127.43, p < 0.01; interaction: c2 (7) = 9.26, p > 0.2). The
expected preference patterns were also observed across pairs
involving the worst options (see Figure 3C).
In summary, participant behavior was consistent with the
value structure depicted in Figure 3A across a range of indepen-
dent option pairings (see Figure S2 for a more complete anal-
ysis). These results demonstrate that participants learned the
relative values of both free-choice and no-choice options, that
preferences were internally consistent across stimulus pairs,
and, as predicted by our computational model, that choice
bias effects are more pronounced across rewarding options.
Impact of Reward Probability on Choice Amplification of
Option Values
The effect of valence on choice bias patterns appears categori-
cal: values are boosted for positive but not negative options, but
with no furthermodulation of value according to reward probabil-
ities. However, the model predicts that reward probability
shapes action weights but with opposing effects on Go versusNeuron 83, 551–557, August 6, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 553
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Figure 3. Derived Value Structure and Implied Preference Patterns
(A) The option value structure derived from the empirically quantified choice bias. No-choice options (nc) take on true expected values. Free-choice options (fc)
take on the true expected values adjusted according to the choice bias for each option. (B) Percent correct (choice of more rewarding option) across trials
involving Afc or Anc. (C) Percent correct across trials involving Bfc or Bnc. All error bars represent SEM.
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RPEs have a greater impact on Go weights for more rewarding
options (e.g., Afc), where positive RPEs are more frequently
encountered. This increases the model’s preference to choose
more rewarding free-choice options, which in itself would drive
greater choice biases with increasing reward probability (i.e.,
bA > bC > bE). However, this is counteracted by the opposite
pattern in NoGo weights, which are larger for more moderately
rewarding options (e.g., Efc). Here, amplified positive RPEs act
to disproportionately decrease NoGo weights for these less
rewarding options. This decreases the model’s preference to
avoid moderately rewarding free-choice options, which on its
own would drive greater choice biases with decreasing reward
probability (i.e., bA < bC < bE).
The opposing biases that develop across Go/NoGo weights
give rise to a balanced effect of choice across rewarding
options when Go/NoGo learning is symmetrical (see Figure 2B).
However, effects of choice in each pathway can be exposed
when Go/NoGo learning is asymmetrical, as captured by the
relative balance between ag and an learning rate parameters.
As illustrated in Figure 4B (and see Figure S4), when Go learning
is emphasized (ag > an), the Go pathway’s choice bias domi-
nates, resulting in a bias that is strongest for the most rewarding
option, and decreases parametrically according to the probabil-
ity of reward (bA > bC > bE). The opposite choice bias pattern
(bA < bC < bE) expressed by the NoGo pathway emerges
when NoGo learning is emphasized (ag < an). Thus, the compu-
tational model predicts that choice bias patterns should vary as
a function of learning asymmetries and individual differences
thereof.
We sought to determine whether the behavioral conse-
quences of Go/NoGo learning asymmetries were consistent
with the model-generated choice bias patterns. To do so, we
analyzed behavior according to DARPP-32 genotype, a gene
associated with striatal dopamine function (Stipanovich et al.,
2008), and asymmetries in Go versus NoGo learning (Doll
et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2007, 2009). First, by fitting model554 Neuron 83, 551–557, August 6, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.parameters to the trial-by-trial behavioral data, we established
that DARPP-32 genotype was associated with identifiable Go/
NoGo learning asymmetries. Bayesian model selection (Stephan
et al., 2009) demonstrated that TT-carriers were best fit by a
model that enforced an ag> an learning rate asymmetry, whereas
C-carriers were best fit by a model that enforced an ag < an
learning rate asymmetry (see supplemental procedures and
Table S2 for model fitting and comparison). In line with the
model’s prediction, and as illustrated in Figure 4C, analyses
revealed a gene group by value interaction (c2(2) = 9.88, p =
0.007). Analysis within each gene group in isolation revealed
that C-carriers (ag < an) exhibited a bA < bC < bE choice bias
pattern (z = 2.85, p < 0.005), whereas TT-carriers (ag > an) ex-
hibited the reverse bA > bC > bE choice bias pattern (z = 1.83,
p = 0.068).
DISCUSSION
Consistent with our hypothesis that choice selectively amplifies
positive RPEs, free choice biases were observed across
rewarding but not nonrewarding options. We also show evi-
dence suggesting that amplified positive RPEs have differential
effects depending on the relative balance between learning
from positive and negative outcomes. The implications of this
model for choice bias are such that RPE amplification increases
Go weights and decreases NoGo weights for rewarding options,
simultaneously increasing the propensity to choose the most
strongly rewarded options (e.g., Afc) and reducing the propensity
to avoid moderately rewarding options (e.g., Efc). As seen in our
sample as a whole, a balanced choice bias pattern emerges
across rewarding options when learning is balanced across
Go/NoGo pathways. This supports prior work linking choice
biases to BG function (Leotti and Delgado, 2011, 2014; Sharot
et al., 2009), and extends those findings by providing a mecha-
nistic explanation supported by quantitative behavioral and
modeling evidence. This mechanism also provides a natural
explanation for the boundary conditions under which choice
A B C
Figure 4. Effects of Positive RPE Amplification on Actor Weights and Its Interaction with Learning Asymmetries
(A) The effect of amplified positive RPEs onGo (Qg) and NoGo (Qng) weights. Goweights for themost rewarding options are preferentially amplified, increasing the
model’s propensity to select those options in accordance with the degree of amplification (Afc > Cfc > Efc). NoGo weights for the least rewarding options are
preferentially dampened, decreasing the model’s propensity to avoid those options in accordance with the degree of dampening (Afc < Cfc < Efc). (B) The
interaction between afc+ and the ag / an asymmetry. (C) Choice-bias according to DARPP-32 gene groups (C or TT) as a function of expected value. Bars represent
behavioral data, and points represent options preferences recovered from the best fitting model. Error bars indicate SEM.
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prediction errors exhibit a greater free choice bias.
Our results also demonstrate that the relative balance of
learning in the opponent pathways determines the degree to
which amplified positive RPEs accumulated in Go or NoGo
weights, yielding distinct choice bias patterns. We found that
DARPP-32 genotype, a gene variant that has been linked to stria-
tal plasticity and asymmetries in learning from positive versus
negative RPEs (Doll et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2007, 2009; Stipa-
novich et al., 2008), predicted individual choice bias differences.
This result not only informs us of individual differences in their
own right, but more generally, it exposes the underlying mecha-
nism of choice bias rooted in the BG’s circuitry, and is particu-
larly diagnostic of our model. Importantly, the choice bias
patterns observed across DARPP-32 gene groups argues
against an attentional explanation of choice bias, wherein a
choice bias emerges because engagement is greater during
endogenous action selection. Indeed, evidence suggests that
engagement is greater when being rewarded, which often leads
to a confound between reward and attention (Maunsell, 2004).
However, DARPP-32 C-carriers show a weaker bias for more
reliably rewarded options, which is consistent with our computa-
tional model, but contrary to the predicted effects of reward on
task engagement.
Similar patterns of choice biases have been reported, with
more pronounced biases for selected relative to rejected options
(Sharot et al., 2009), and stronger biases for options predictive of
gains relative to those predictive of losses (Leotti and Delgado,
2014). However, as reported by Leotti and Delgado (2014),
choice biases for aversive options are subject to both contextual
effects and high variability. Indeed, our sample included a small
number of participants (n = 16 of 80 total) that exhibited a bias for
aversive options. However, these biases were unsystematic,
with individual participants exhibiting both a preference and
aversion for different negative options. Furthermore, we couldidentify neither genetic, nor computational, nor behavioral pre-
dictors of negative option choice biases, suggesting that mech-
anisms beyond dopaminergic striatal learning play a role in
shaping biases for negative options.
We have focused our efforts on investigating the interaction
between choice and learning. However, humans also exhibit a
preference for choice in general (Bown et al., 2003; Leotti and
Delgado, 2011, 2014), an issue we have not tackled here. This
choice preference may reflect the inherent value of choice, but
it may also reflect a learned benefit for the general state of
choice. As alluded to previously, freely chosen outcomes are
more likely to meet an organism’s needs, and as such, an organ-
ism could learn to favor environmental states that afford choice
as better predictors of reward. Choice may also come to be
favored via temporal difference learning, whereby augmented
option values, amplified via the BG/SNc mechanism discussed
here, are propagated to option predictive states. Although these
possibilities offer interesting avenues for future research, they all
appear to be at oddswith reports of choice aversion (Iyengar and
Lepper, 2000). We suggest that choice may be rendered appeti-
tive or aversive according to the degree of choice conflict driven
by candidate options. Complex choice spaces, such as those
employed by Iyengar and Lepper (2000), could potentially
generate a sufficiently high degree of choice conflict so as to pro-
hibit option selection, perhaps via inhibitory mechanisms such
as the subthalamic nucleus (Frank, 2006).
Although our results suggest that choice is associated with
better learning from positive RPEs, it raises the obvious question
of why this should be the case. The BG is commonly thought to
embody a gating function that biases action selection (Ashby
et al., 2007; Frank, 2005; Mink, 1996). This gating function is
embodied by the connectivity of medium spiny neurons in the
dorsal striatum, which take part in either the direct Go or the
indirect NoGo pathway (Alexander andCrutcher, 1990). The rela-
tive difference between Go and NoGo activity for candidateNeuron 83, 551–557, August 6, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 555
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which action will be gated through to the thalamus, providing a
selection bias for candidate actions (Frank, 2005). Phasic DA sig-
nals from the SNc are thought to provide the learning signals
required to develop appropriate Go and NoGo associations via
downstream effects on D1 and D2 receptors.
However, action selection is not determined by the BG alone,
and as such, executed actions may differ from actions preferred
by the BG. Thus, broadcasting RL signals uniformly across the
brain presents a credit assignment problem: how do the circuits
involved ensure that reinforcement is reliably delivered to the
neural systems coding for the action that was actually executed?
Solutions to this problem often invoke the notion that only
recently active neuronswill be subject toDA-modulatedplasticity
(Schultz, 2002; Wickens et al., 1996). However, this allows for
reinforcement in systems engaged by the decision-making pro-
cess, but whose actions were not ultimately executed. The prob-
lem is compounded furtherwithinBG itself, where cells coding for
actions that were considered but not ultimately gated could be
inappropriately shaped by dopaminergic signals (see Figure 2A).
One solution to the BG’s credit assignment problem is pro-
vided if DA neurons in the SNc are themselves gated specifically
when the BG gates an action, a mechanism that could be
embodied by disinhibitory projections from the SNr. According
to this scheme, the BG helps solve its own credit assignment
problem by providing the SNc with information diagnostic of
action gating. This signal primes DA cells in the SNc such that
phasic DA bursts broadcast to the striatumwill be more effective
whenever the BG takes part in the action selection process.
Pushing this idea further, the SNr could potentially provide the
SNc with information that not only signals action gating, but a
richer signal diagnostic of the action itself. This information could
then be integrated by the SNc so as to structure phasic DA sig-
nals in a way that preferentially targets populations of striatal
cells encoding the gated action. Although it is not currently
known whether the SNc’s projection architecture is capable of
supporting such a richly structured signal, we believe this to be
a computationally alluring possibility.
The problem of credit assignment is often overlooked: some-
how, the brain’s learning signals are delivered to the correct
addresses across a labyrinthine landscape. Recent work has
proposed that learning signals are decomposed into effector-
specific components when appropriate (Gershman et al.,
2009), suggesting that learning signals can indeed be structured.
We have proposed a relatively simple mechanism through which
learning signals may be endowed with such structure and have
demonstrated that this mechanism explains why organisms pre-
fer options they have freely chosen. In short, learning signals
associated with freely chosen options are more efficacious
owing to the engagement of a feedback loop between the BG
and DA systems tasked with mitigating the challenge of credit
assignment, which emerges behaviorally as a free-choice bias.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Sample
Eighty participants were recruited from Brown University and the Providence,
Rhode Island community. Six participants did not demonstrate task learning556 Neuron 83, 551–557, August 6, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.andwere excluded from the analysis (quantified as below chance performance
on trials involving Afc or Bfc). However, the main results reported here hold
when all participants are included in the analysis. The Brown University Human
Research Committee approved all task procedures.
Participants provided a saliva sample following the task. We obtained geno-
type data on an SNP of the PPP1R1B (DARPP-32) gene (rs907094), and
an SNP of the DRD2 gene (rs6277), both of which have been associated
with striatal DA function (Hirvonen et al., 2009; Stipanovich et al., 2008), and
the val158met SNP of the COMT gene (rs4680), which has been associated
with extracellular DA levels in prefrontal cortex (Huotari et al., 2002; Matsu-
moto et al., 2003). DARPP-32 allele frequency was 7:35:32 (C/C:C/T:T/T),
DRD2 allele frequency was 21:45:8 (C/C:C/T:T/T), and COMT allele frequency
was 13:38:23 (MetMet:ValMet:ValVal). All SNPs were in Hardy–Weinberg equi-
librium (c2 values < 1, p values > 0.4). Categorical gene groupswere defined by
grouping themost infrequent homogeneous allele carriers with heterogeneous
allele carriers, producing DARPP-32 C:TT groups (42:32), DRD2 CC:T (21:53)
groups, andCOMTMet:ValVal groups (51:23). There was a positive correlation
between DARPP-32 and DRD2 T allele frequency (r(72) = 0.26, p = 0.03), and a
trend for a positive correlation between categorical gene groups (r(72) = 0.19,
p = 0.1). We controlled for this interaction by including DRD2 as a covariate
in all statistical models investigating genetic predictors of behavior. There
were no correlations between COMT and either DARPP-32 or DRD2 allele
frequency or gene groups (all p values > 0.4).
Most participants self-identified as Caucasian (49 participants). To control
for population stratification as a potential confounding factor, we included
race as a covariate in all statistical models that also included gene group as
a factor. However, the results reported in the main paper hold when minority
groups were removed from the analysis.
Procedures
Participants viewed pairs of visual stimuli that are not easily verbalized. Dur-
ing the training phase, six different stimulus pairs were presented in random
order, with probabilistic feedback following option selection (either a point
gained or lost). Choosing option Afc led to positive feedback 80% of the
time, whereas choosing option Bfc led to positive feedback only 20%
of the time. CfcDfc and EfcFfc pairs were less reliable (see Figure 1A for all
reward contingencies).
On free-choice trials participants could choose either option presented to
them. No-choice trials were yoked to free-choice trials to ensure identical
sampling and reinforcement histories between conditions. The selected op-
tion and feedback from each free-choice trial was recorded and used to
generate a yoked no-choice trial. For example, if Cfc was selected on a CfcDfc
trial, and 1 was provided as feedback, a corresponding CncDnc trial would
be generated that forced the selection of Cnc (indicated by a blue frame
surrounding that option) and provide 1 as feedback. Thus, options in
both conditions were sampled the same number of times and delivered
the same feedback.
Participants completed at least four and at most six training blocks. Each
consisted of 20 exposures to each of the six option pairs. A performance cri-
terion evaluated at the end of each block ensured that all participants were at
approximately same performance level before advancing to the test phase
(65% selection of Afc, 60% selection of Cfc, 50% selection of Efc). Participants
could advance to the test phase of the task after completing aminimum of four
blocks and exceeding the practice criterion or after six blocks.
Participants were subsequently tested on a full permutation of all possible
option pairings (eight pairings of each choice bias pair, and four repetitions
of all other pairings) in random order. Participants were free to choose either
option on each test trial but were no longer provided feedback (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures for a detailed description of the experimental
design).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
three figures, and three tables and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2014.06.035.
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